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AN INTERESTING CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION.

How

UNAUTHORIZED GUBERNATORIAL APPOINTMENTS TO

THE UNITED STATES SENATE MAY BE ATTACKED.

To the lawyer there is, perhaps, a no more interesting document than the Constitution of the United States. Framed by
master minds who knew the wisdom of declaring the rights
and privileges of the central government without defining
them, and construed by the most astute legal intellects, it
stands as a monument to the learning and understanding of
the American people. It expands with the nation and is ever
ready to include within its grasp new conditions which may
arise so that, with few changes in its verbiage, it has already
grown a hundred fold since its execution. Applied from time
to time to existing facts, there are now few cases in which its
construction is not required because of some new condition or
conditions. There are still, however, some questions which
might have been presented in the i8th Century but which
have been left undiscussed until the present day, and among
them is the subject of our paper.
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The Supreme Court of the United States construes the
Constitution, and until its decision has been rendered upon
any clause, that clause remains, strictly speaking, undefined.
The Supreme Court speaks and, as to the application of the
Constitution to the facts before it, its words are final. But
where it has not spoken it is proper to discuss what its construction might be of one of those undefined clauses such as
that which we are now to treat, viz.: "Each house shall be
the judge of the elections, returns and qualfications of its own
members." Part of Article I, Section 5.
It is conceded that under this clause, each house is the sole
judge of "the elections, returns and qualifications of its own
members," but the lay mind will immediately inquire what
bearing this clause has upon gubernatorial appointments which
are neither elections, returns nor qualifications. This inquiry
brings us directly to the burden of our subject.
Section 3 of Article I declares, interalia, that, "The Senate
of the United States shall be composed of two senators from
each state, chosen by the legislature thereof, for six years; and
each senator shall have one vote.
"Immediately after they shall be assembled, in consequence
of the first election, they shall be divided as equally as may be
.into three classes. The seats of the senators of the first class
shall be vacated at the expiration of the second year, of the
second class at the expiration of the fourth year, and of the
third class at the expiration of the sixth year, so that only
three may be chosen every second year; and if vacancies
happen by resignation or otherwise during the recess of the
legislature of any state, the executive thereof may make temporary appointments until the next meeting of the legislature,
which shall then fill such vacancies.
"No person shall be a senator who shall not have attained
to the age of thirty and been nine years a citizen of the United
States, and who shall not when elected be an inhabitant of
that state of which he shall be chosen."
Section 4. " The times, places and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives shall be prescribed in
each state by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at
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any time by law make or alter such regulations except as to
the place of choosing senators."
It is perfectly clear that the Constitution does not in express
terms provide that either house shall be the judge of the
appoitents of its own members. Such a provision would,
of course, only apply to the Senate, there being no power of
appointment to the House of Representatives. The question,
therefore, is whether or no the power to pass upon appointments is implied in the Senate. This implication might arise
in one of two ways: I. From the terms of the Constitution
itself applying thereto the ordinary rules of construction; or 2.
From the inherent nature of the body exercising'the power.
Before considering these two possible implications it may be
well to notice in passing the words used: "Elections, returns
is practically
and qualifications." The word "election"
defined in an earlier clause above quoted which declares that
a senator shall be chosen by the legislature and what the Senate shall do immediately after such election. In its broadest
significance, the word cannot mean appointment, the same
section declaring that in one event the executive of a state may
make temporary appointments. In short, an election is a
choice by the legislature representing the people, and an
appointment is merely a nomination by the executive as a
matter o convenience. The word "returns" used in connection with elections refers to the formalities accompanying
and succeeding the actual election. Qualifications refers to
personal requirements. To quote from the Federalist,No. 62,
"The qualificationsproposed for senators as distinguished from
those of representatives consist in a more advanced age and a
longer period of citizenship. A senator must be thirty years
of age, at least; as a representative must be twenty-five. And
the former must have been a citizen nine years; as seven years
are required for the latter."
Having thus referred briefly to the three words used without attempting a minute examination of each, this paper being
intended to be rather suggestive than argumentative, we will
proceed to see how far the word "appointments" may be impliedly inserted in the Constitution. And first we must
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observe the terms of the Constitution itself. In doing this let
us remember that " it is established as a general rule that when
a constitution gives a general power, or enjoins a duty, it also
gives by implication every particular power necessary for the
exercise of the one or the performance of the other. The implication under this rule, however, must be a necessary, not a
conjectural or argumentative one:" Cooley's Constitutional
Limitations, 78 . And the implication can only be of the particular powers necessary for the exercise of the general power.
Where, therefore, the Senate is given the power to judge of
the elections, returns and qualifications of its own members,
only those additional powers can be implied widhc are necessary
to arrive at a satisfactory judgment in regard to such elections,
returns and qualifications.
On the other hand, as gubernatorial appointments are merely
substitutionary, only allowed to be made when an election is
not practical owing to the state legislature not being in session
at the time the vacancy in representation to the Senate occurs,
it might be argued that the word "elections " should be held
to include not only elections proper but their substitutes as
well.
The objection to this argument is that it is conjectural and
open to the criticism that might very well be made and which
is justified by an examination of the instrument, that the framers of the Constitution did not construct phrases in that loose
manner. The argument depends for its strength upon the intention of those gentlemen, and while it is conceded that
intention is a very necessary element in construing doubtful or
inconsistent clauses only of any instrument, it may also be
urged, if intention is brought into the discussion, that the
word "appointment " was intentionally omitted in order to
avoid just what is now threatened in the State of Pennsylvania.
During the last session of the legislature of that state, the
term of United States Senator M. S. Quay expired, and
several attempts were made to elect a successor. Owing to
what is commonly known as a "deadlock" the legislature
failed in its attempt. Mr. Quay was one of the nominees
considered by the legislature. Shortly after the adjournment
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of the legislature the governor of the state appointed Mr.
Quay to succeed himself. Owing to the impression that
there is no remedy in courts of law, there haie been many
conjectures regarding the action which the United States
Senate will take in the matter, the interest in which has been
heightened by the fact that Mr. Quay is not the choice of the
legislature of Pennsylvania.
Representation is the rock upon which our free institutions
are founded. It is the mother of those institutions, gave them
birth and nourished them to become the common heritage of
all. This principle of government is encased in the Constitution which we regard with reverence and admiration as we regard, a masterpiece of art. It is not, therefore, unreasonable
to believe that, while the Constitution gave the executive of
any state the power to make an individual and, perhaps, personal appointment to the United States Senate, its authors intended to protect the citizens against the abuse of that power
by leaving in their hands every available instrument of restraint, and accomplished their purpose by refraining from
making the Senate the judge of the appointment of its members.
Were this an argument before a court of law there might
be many other points suggested in this connection, but as we
are merely reviewing briefly and in a general way a constitutional question, and as there are other phases of it, we may
now proceed to a brief consideration of the latter.
Having observed the terms of the instrument itself, let us
secondly regard the question before us in the light of the inherent nature of the Senate. There are certain powers inherent in the highest legislative bodies. When the people, the
sovereignty, come together to organize a government they
"parcel out the three great powers thereof, the legislative, the
executive and the judicial, among the three co-ordinate and
principal depositaries to which they are committed. Though
the Constitution confers upon specified courts general judicial
power, there are certain powers of a judicial nature which by
the express terms of the same instrument are given to the
legislative body and among them" the power to judge of the
elections, returns and qualifications of its members. "In such
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case it may well be that a form of words in the instrument
that clearly makes a gift of judicial power to one co-ordinate
body should be construed as reserving the particular power
thus bestowed from the general conferment of judicial power
by the same instrument, at the same time, upon another coordinate body. The power thus given to the houses of the
legislature is a judicial power, and each house acts in a judicial
capacity when it exerts it. The express vesting of the judicial power, in a particular case, so closely and vitally affecting
the body to whom that power is given, takes it out of the
general judicial power."
It may further be stated to be a general rule of law that a
supreme legislative body has, by implication, extra express
grant, power to judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its members. But where that power is expressly
given there is, of course, no implication. It might also be
suggested here that where the power to judge of an election
isgiven, and there is provision for an appointment, the power
to judge of which is not expressly given, the latter is not
lodged exclusively in the body to whom the appointment is
made. The United States Senate has, of course, the power
by implication to pass upon the appointment of its members
.until the appointment is questioned by a court of competent
jurisdiction, but that power is not, like the others, made exclusive by being given in express terms. On the contrary,
the opposite conclusion might be urged with considerable
force, namely: That by its omission from the express grants
there is a strong implication that the Senate's jurisdiction is
not to be exclusive in regard to it.
As already intimated above, this construction might be
urged as appearing to make a very proper disposition of the
question. Although the power to pass upon elections, etc.,
has been defined as judicial, it is in reality rather one of the
powers incident to a jury-to pass upon facts. The judicial
function is merely incidental. Election controversies consist
very largely of matters of fact, such as whether one man or
another has received a greater number of votes. Returns are
mere matters of orm, while qualifications are entirely matters

AN INTERESTING CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION.

of fact. When, therefore, there may be a controversy which
shall involve nothing but principles of law, it is reasonable that
jurisdiction over such should not. be taken from 'the courts of
justice. A contested appointment is a controversy of that
kind. One governor is not likely to appoint two men to the
same position, and it is difficult to conceive of any other reason existing for attacking an appointment than that the
governor was not authorized by law to, make it. If this was
the reasoning of our forefathers, experience has demonstrated
their sagacity. There have been several gubernatorial appointments to the United States Senate, and in all cases where
the appointment proper has been attacked the attack, so far
as the writer is aware, has been based entirely upoi constitutional incapacity in the governor making the appointment.
Heretofore, the decisions of the Senate have been uniform
upon the question now presented again by Mr. Quay's application for a seat. The seat has been refused on the ground
that the governor can only make an appointment when, in the
terms of the Constitution, "vacancies happen by resignation
or otherwise during the recess of the legislature of any state."
There has, therefore, been no opportunity for the possible application of the remedy about to be suggested. It is probably
for this reason that the question under discussion has not
And again there
already been authoritatively determined.
may be no opportunity for raising it if the United States
Senate abides by the terms of the Constitution.
Section 2, Article III. of the Constitution provides that,
"the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity
.....
"
Mr. Cooley
arising under this Constitution.
in his work entitled Constitutional Limitations says that, "so
far as the instrument apportions powers to the national judiciary it must be understood for the most part as simply
authorizing Congress to pass the necessary legislation for the
exercise of those powers by the Federal courts, and not as
directly, of its own force, vesting them with that authority.
The Constitution does not of its own force give to national
courts jurisdiction of the several cases which it enumerates,
but an Act of Congress is essential, first: to create courts and
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afterwards to apportion the jurisdiction among them. The
exceptions are of those few cases of which the Constitution
confers jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court by name, and
although the courts of the United States administer the common law in many cases, they can recognize as offences against
the nation only those acts which are made criminal and their
punishment provided for by Acts of Congress."
The Act of Congress of 27th February, i8oi, provides in
Section I, that the laws of the State of Maryland, as they then
existed shall be and continue in force in that part of the District of Columbia, which was ceded by that state to the
United States. This is an important provision when it is recalled that the common law of England was in force in Maryland at that time. The third section of the act provides that,
"there shall be a court in this district which shall be called
the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia; the said court
and the judges thereof shall have all the powers by law vested
in the Circuit Courts and the judges of the Circuit Courts of
the United States."
By the fifth section the court has cognizance of all actions
or suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity in which
the United States shall be plaintiffs or complainants; and also
*of all cases in law and equity between parties, both or either
of whom shall be resident or found within the district.
Under the terms of the Constitution and this act it is suggested that information in the nature of quo warrantoproceedings might be instituted in the Supreme Court of the District
of Columbia by the United States, through its proper officer,
against one occupying a seat in the United States Senate by
virtue of an unconstitutional appointment. The United States
Government represents the people who, in this country, are
the sovereign power. The late lamented James L. High in
"Extraordinary Legal Remedies," says, " since under the
American system all power emenates from the people who
constitute the sovereignty the right to inquire into the
authority by which any person assumes to exercise the functions of a public office or franchise is regardedas inherent in
te people in the right of their sovereignty. And the title to

AN INTERESTING CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION.

office being derived from the will- of the. people, they are
necessarily vested with a right of enforcing their express will
by excluding usurpers from public offices. Nor is this right
in any manner impaired by statutes .granting to electors in
their private capacity as citizens the right to contest the elec'tion.of any person assuming to exercise the functions of an
office. Such statutes may have the effect of sharing the right
with 'the elector but they do not take away the rightfrom the
people in their soverezgn capit"

Ihformation in' the nature of quo warranto is a common law
remedy. In this connection it might be well to cite a passage
from the opinion of Mr. Chief justice Tillman in an old Penn.
sylvania case (Commonwealtk v. Murray, II S. & R. 74), de-

cided in 1824: "The Statute of 9 Anne not having been
extended to this commonwealth all our proceedings in 'the
nature of quo warranto are at common law. The ancient
writ of quo warranto having been found inconvenient has long
been discontinued 'and the information in nature of quo warranto adopted in lieu of it. But informations are not granted
except in cases where the writ itself would have lain. We
must inquire, therefore, what those cases are. The object of
the writ of quo.warranto seems to have been to remove some
usurpation of the rights or prerogatives of the crown. It is
defined by Blackstone (3 Com. 262) to be "in nature of a
writ of right for the king against him who claims or usurps
any office, franchise or liberty to inquire by what authority he
supports his claim in order to determine the right."
Before the people, the sovereignty, can interfere, two things
are requisite : First, it must appear that they have not transferred their right to any person or body of persons, and
second, the court to which their petition is presented must be
shown to have jurisdiction. The first of these has already
been discussed and the second is now under consideration.
There appears to be strong ground for the contention that, in
view of the nature of *the proceedings, jurisdiction of the
question before us has been lodged in the Supreme Court of
the District of Columbia by the language of the Constitution
and the Acts of Congress. We have seen that the suit sug-

730

AN INTERESTING CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION.

gested, information in the nature of qzto warranto, is one to
be brought by the sovereign, the United States, and that the
remedy is a common law remedy.
Bearing in mind, then, that the Supreme Court of the District
of Columbia (it having succeeded the Circuit Court of that
district) exercises, through the adoption of the law of Maryland, a common law jurisdiction, and that information in the
nature of quo warranto was a common law proceeding just as
mandamus was a common law proceeding, the remarks of Mr.
Justice Thompson in Kendall v. United States, ex. rel., 12
Peter-, 524, will throw light upon the subject:
"-But let us examine the Act of Congress of the 27th of
February, 18oi, concerning the District of Columbia, and by
which the Circuit Court is organized and its powers and jurisdiction pointed out. And it is proper, preliminarily, to remark that, under the Constitution of the United States and
the cessions made by the states of Virginia and Maryland, the
exercise of exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever is
given to Congress. And it is a sound principle, that in every
well-organized government the judicial power should be coextensive with the legislative, so far, at least, as private rights
are to be enforced by judicial proceedings. There is in this
district no division of powers between the general and state
.governments. Congress has the entire control over the district for every purpose of government, and it is reasonable to
suppose that, in organizing a judicial department here, all
judicial power necessary for the purposes of government
would be vested in the courts of justice. The Circuit Court
here is the highest court of original jurisdiction, and if the
power to issue a mandamus in a case like the present exists
in any court it is vested in that court.
"Keeping this consideration in view, let us look at the Act
of Congress.
--The first section declares that the laws of the State of
Maryland, as they now exist, shall be and continue in force in
that part of the district which was ceded by that state to the
United States, which is the part lying on this side the Potomac,
where the court was sitting when the mandamus was issued.
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It was admitted on the argument that, at the date of this act
the common law of England was in force in Maryland, and,
of course, it remained and continued in force in this part of
the district; and. that the power to issue a mandamus -in a
proper case is a branch of the common law-cannot be doubted,
and has been fully recognized as in practical operation in that
state in the case of Runkel v. Winemiller and others, 4 Harris

& M'Henry, 448. That case came before the court on a motion to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not issue,
commanding the defendants to restore the Rev. William
Runkel into the place and functions of minister of a certain congregation. The court entertained the motion, arid afterwards
issued a peremptory mandamus. And in the opinion delivered by the court on the motion, reference is made to the
English doctrine on the subject of mandamus; and the court
say that it is a prerogative writ, and grantable when the
public justice of the state is concerned, and commands the
execution of an act where otherwise justice would be obstructed: 3 Bac. Ab. 527. It is denominated a prerogative
writ, because the king being the fountain of justice, it is interposed by his authority transferred to the court of king's
bench, to prevent disorder from a failure of justice where the
law has established no specific remedy, and where, in justice
and good government, there ought to be one: 3 Burr, 1267.
It is a writ of right, and lies where there is a right to execute
an office, perform a service or exercise a franchise, and a person is kept out of possession and dispossessed of such right
and has no other specific legal remedy: 3 Burr, 1266.
"These and other cases where a mandamus has been considered in England as a fit and appropriate remedy are referred
to by the general court, and it is then added that the position
that this court is invested with similar powers is generally admitted, and the decisions have invariably conformed to it, from
whence, say the court, the inference is plainly deducible that
this court may, and of tght ought,for the sake ofjustice, to interpose in a summary way to supply a remedy, where, for the
want of a specfl one, there would otherwise be a failure of
justice.
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"The theory of the British Government and of the common

law is, that the writ of mandamus is a prerogative writ, and
is sometimes called one of the flowers of the crown, and is
therefore, confided only to the king's bench, where the king,
at one period of the judicial history of that country, is said to
have sat in person, and is presumed still to sit. And the
power to issue this writ is given to the king's bench only, as
having the general supervising power over all inferior jurisdictions and officers, and is coextensive with judicial sovereignty. And the same theory prevails in our state governments where the common law is adopted, and governs in the
administration of justice; and the power of issuing this writ
is generally confided to the highest court of original jurisdiction. But it cannot be denied that this common law pr nciple
may be modified by the legislature in any manner that may
be deemed proper and expedient. No doubt the British Parliament might authorize the Court of Common Pleas to issue
this writ, or that the legislature of the states where this doctrine prevails might give the power to issue the writ to any
judicial tribunal in the state according to its pleasure, and in
some of the states this power is vested in other judicial tribunals than the highest court of original jurisdiction. This is
done in the State of Maryland, subsequent, however, to the27th of February, i8oi. There can be no doubt but that, in
the State of Maryland, a writ of mandamus might be issued
to an executive officer, commanding him to perform a ministerial act required of him by law, and if it would lie in that
state there can be no good reason why it should not lie in this
district in analogous cases. But the writ of mandamus, as it
is used in the courts of the United States, other than the Circuit Court of this district, cannot, in any just sense, be said to
be a prerogative writ according to the principles of the com
mon law.
"The common law leas not been adopted by the United States
as a system in the statesgenerally as has been done with respect
to this district."
"Thus far the power of the Circuit Court to issue the writ
of mandamus has been considered as derived under the first
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section of the Act of 27th *ofFebruary, 18oi. But the third
and fifth sections are to be taken into consideration in deciding
this question. The third section, so far as it relates to the
this
present inquiry, declares: ' That there shall be a court in"
district, which shall be called the Circuit Court of the District
of Columbia; and the said court, and the judges thereof, shall
have all the powers by law vested in the Circuit Courts and the
judges of the Circuit Courts of the United States.' And the
fifth section declares: ' That the said court shall have cognizance
of all cases,in law and equity, between parties, both or either of
which shall be resident or be found within the district.'
"By the fifth section, the court has cognizance. of all actions
or suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, in which
the United States shall be plaintiffs or complainants; and also
of all cases in law and equity between parties, both or either of
whom shall be resident or be found within the district. This
latter limitation can only affect the exercise of the jurisdiction,
and cannot limit the subject-matter thereof. No court can, in
the ordinary administration of justice, in common-law proceedings, exercise jurisdiction over a party unless he shall voluntarily appear, or is found within the jurisdiction of the court,
so as to be served with process. Such process cannot reach
the party beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court. And
besides, this is a personal privilege which may be waived by
appearance; and if advantage is to be taken of it, it must be
by plea or some other mode at an early stage in the cause.
No such objection appears to have been made to the
jurisdiction of the court in the present case.
There
was no want of jurisdiction, then, as to the person; and
as to the subject-matter of jurisdiction, it extends, according
to the language of the Act of Congress, to all cases in law and
equity. This, of course, means cases of judicial cognizance.
That proceedings on an application to a court of justice for a
mandamus, are judicial proceedings, cannot admit of a doubt,
and that this is a case in law is equally clear. It is the prosecution of a suit to enforce a right secured by a special Act of
Congress, requiring of the Postmaster-General the performance
of a precise, definite and specific act plainly enjoined by the
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law. It cannot be denied but that Congress had the power to
command that act to be done; and the power to enforce the
performance of the act must rest somewhere, or it will present
a case which has often been said to involvea monstrous absurdity
in a well-organized government, that there should be no remedy,
although a clear and undeniable right should be shown to exist. And if the remedy cannot be applied by the Circuit Court
of this district, it exists nowhere. But, by the express terms
of this act, the jurisdiction of this Circuit Court extends to all
cases in law, etc. No more generallanguagecould have been used.
An attempt at specification would have weakened the force and
extent of the general words, ' all cases.' Here, then, is the delegation, to the Circuit Court, of the wholejudicial power in this
distriet,and in the very language of the Constitution, which de,lares that the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law
and equity arising under the laws of the United States, etc.,
and supplies what was said by this court in the cases of McIntire v. Wood, 7 Cranch, 504, and in M'Clung v. Stiliman, 6
Wheat. 598, to be wanting, namely; That the whole judicial
power had not been delegated to the Circuit Courts in the states,
and which is expressed in the strong language of the court, that
the idea never presented itself to any one that it was not within
the scope of the judicial powers of the United States, although
not vested by law in the courts of the general government."
Referring to the change of the Circuit Court into the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, to which attention
has already been called, it may be well to add that the jurisdiction of the latter is the same as that of the former, as far as
our subject is concerned.
In United States v. Schurz, 102 U. S. 378, Mr. Justice Miller says: "We are met at the threshold of this inquiry by a
denial of the authority of the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia to issue a writ of mandamus as an original process.
"The argument is, that the jurisdiction of that court over
this class of subjects is governed by section 760 of the Revised Statutes relating to the District of Columbia. That section enacts that 'the Supreme Court shall possess the same
power and exercise the same jurisdiction as the Circuit Courts
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of the United States.' As this court decided in HcIntire v.
Wood, 7 Cranch, 5o4, and MlcClung v. Silliman, 6 Wheat.
598, that the Circuit Courts of the United States possessed no
such power, the argument would be perfect if no other powers
on that subject existed in the Supreme Court of the district
than what is conferred by the above section.
" This court, in Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524, had
under consideration the Act of February 27, i8oI, organizing
originally the courts of this district. It was held that the
clause of the act declaring the laws of Maryland to be in force
at that date in the part of the district ceded by her invested
the Circuit Court, as it was then called, with this very power,
because it was a common-law jurisdiction,and the comnion law
on that subject was then in force in Maryland. This proposition
has been repeatedly upheld by the court since that time, and up.
to the date of the revision it was no longer an open question:
that in a proper case the court had authority to issue the writ,
"It is now said, however, that this section being enacted as
of the first day of December, 1873, defines the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court of the district as governed by the powers
of the Circuit Courts of the United States over the same subject
at that date, at which time it is clear these latter courts had no
such power; and that, as the revision repealed all other laws
on the same subject, the act concerning the law of Maryland
no longer applied to the case.
"This leaves out of the process of reasoning the ninetysecond section of the revision, which declares again that 'the laws
of the State of Maryland, not inconsistent with this title, as
the same existed on the twenty-seventh day of July, i8ot,
except as since modified or repealed by Congress or by authority thereof, or until so modified or repealed, continue in force
within the district.' Thus the argument is precisely the same as
it was in Kendallv. UnitedStates,for it was urged there, as here,
that as the act creating the court measured its jurisdiction by
that of the Circuit Courts of the United States, which had no
jurisdiction, there could be none in the former; to which the
court replied, the provision which continued in force the laws
of Maryland.
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"The revision has merely separated the different sections of
the Act of February 27, x8oI, and placed part of it in section 76o
and part of it in section 92. Neither provision is repealed,
and we think that both of them are retained, with the construction placed on them by this court in Kendall v. United
States and the subsequent cases. But this question would
seem to be set at rest by the Act of 1877, 'to perfect the revision of the statutes of the United States, and of the statutes
relating to the District of Columbia.' The act amends section
763 of the Revised Statutes relating to the District of Columbia, by enacting that ' said courts shall have cognizance of all
crimes and offences committed within said district, and of all
cases in law and equity between parties, both or either of
which shall be resident or be found within said district, and
also of all actions or suits of. a civil nature at common law or
in.
equity, in which the United States shall be plaintiffs or complainants :' 19 Stat. 253.
"We are of opinion that the authority to issue writs of
mandamus in cases in which the parties are by the common law
exitied to them is vested in the Supreme Court of the District
of Columbia."
Where there is a right there should be a remedy for its infringement and a satisfactory one. If it be true that the
exclusive power to pass upon appointments to its body was
withheld from the Senate because that power should not be
taken from the people, it follows that the people are entitled to
a remedy in the case before us and the Acts of Congress will
be construed in a manner to afford that remedy if such construction is in harmony with the language of those acts.
In conclusion, it might be added that there have been some
suggestions in current literature that the one remedy for unauthorized gubernatorial appointments, if confirmed by the
Senate, lies in an amendment of the Constitution. It is this
suggestion that has influenced the writer to offer a counter one.
The question is an interesting one in itself, aside from the fact
that it may never arise in a court of law, owing to the respect
which the people at large, through their representatives assembled in Congress, have for the Constitution.
Reginald H. Tnes.

